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NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THE GENERAL AVIATION
REVITALIZATION ACT IS IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE
UNDER THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE:
ESTATE OF KENNEDY V. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.
CARTER BOISVERT
N 1994, CONGRESS enacted the General Aviation Revitaliza-
tion Act ("GARA") in an effort to rejuvenate the general avia-
tion aircraft industry out of concern over the product liability
costs imposed on manufacturers by the tort system.' The pas-
sage of GARA created an eighteen-year statute of repose in
certain lawsuits that involve general aviation aircraft manufac-
turers.2 In the recent case of Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the
GARA statute of repose in a dispute over when the running of
the statute should begin. While the court correctly analyzed
GARA according to the plain language of the statute, the court
unnecessarily expanded the collateral order doctrine4 to allow
immediate appeals when a trial court rejects the GARA defense
to liability.5
On November 5, 1996, Robin Grant Kennedy was killed while
piloting a helicopter used for aerial logging in Washington
I For a detailed discussion of the effects of GARA on the general aviation air-
craft industry, see Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The General Aviation and
Revitalization Act: How Rational Civil Justice Reforn Revitalized an Industry, 67J. AiR
L. & CoM. 1269 (2002); see also PhillipJ. Kolczynski, GARA: A Status Report, Avweb
Aviation Law (Jan. 14, 2001), at http://www.avweb.com/news/avlaw/181905-1.
html.
2 General Aviation Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(a), 108 Stat.
1552 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note).
3 Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir.
2002).
4 The collateral order doctrine allows immediate appeals, despite final judg-
ment, of district court decisions that are conclusive, resolve important questions
completely separate from the merits, and would render such important questions
effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994).
5 Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110-11.
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when the helicopter came apart in mid-air and crashed.6 Bell
Helicopter originally manufactured the helicopter and deliv-
ered it to the U.S. Navy in 1970.7 The Navy subsequently sold
the helicopter as military surplus for civilian use in 1984, and
since that time it had been owned by various private entities.8
After Kennedy's death, his estate filed a diversity products liabil-
ity action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington against Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., and Garlick
Helicopters, Inc., and the parties filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment.9
Bell Helicopter argued in its motion for summary judgment
that GARA barred all claims brought against it by Kennedy.'0
The district court, however, in granting partial summary judg-
ment for the plaintiff, rejected this defense and found that Bell
Helicopter manufactured the helicopter and, therefore, had a
duty to warn of design defects under Washington law. ' I Bell He-
licopter filed a notice of appeal before final judgment, arguing
appellate jurisdiction existed for its GARA statute of repose
claim under the collateral order doctrine. 12
While the critical issue in the case concerned the event trig-
gering the running of the GARA statute of repose, the court of
appeals established its appellate jurisdiction by applying the col-
lateral order doctrine. Under Section 1291 of the judicial Code,
appeals as of right are confined to those from "final decisions of
the district courts."' 3 In Kennedy, the court stated that "the col-
lateral order doctrine arises from a 'practical construction' of
§ 1291's final decision rule and establishes a narrow class of de-
cisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the in-
6 Id. at 1109.
7 Id. at 1111.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1109. The district court dismissed all claims against Garlick by granting
its motion for summary judgment, finding that it did not manufacture the heli-
copter and therefore could not be liable under Washington products liability law.
Id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030(1) (West 1992).
1o Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1109.
1Id. The court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs because
the court found that genuine issues of material fact existed on the issues of
whether Bell Helicopter failed to warn and if a design defect existed that proxi-
mately caused Kennedy's accident. Id.
12 Id. at 1110.
13 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). A final decision is normally not deemed to
occur "until there has been a decision by the district court that ends the litigation
on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."
Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989).
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terest of achieving a healthy legal system nonetheless be treated
as final." 4 The court further outlined the three requirements
needed to fall into this narrow class of immediately appealable
orders. Specifically, the district court decision must: 1) be con-
clusive, 2) resolve important questions completely separate from
the merits, and 3) render those questions effectively unreview-
able on appeal from a final judgment. 5 In reviewing these fac-
tors, the court stated, "[t]he district court's order is conclusive,
and, like qualified immunity accorded to government officials,
the applicability of the GARA statute of repose is an important
question which is resolved completely separate from the merits
of the litigation."' 6 Therefore, the Kennedy court quickly con-
cluded that the decision of the district court easily met the first
two factors.
The third requirement, that the important questions be effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment, required
more discussion from the court. The court concluded that the
GARA statute of repose met the third condition as well because
the explicit statutory right not to stand trial created by GARA
would be irretrievably lost if the district court forced Bell Heli-
copter to defend itself in a full trial. 17 "The plain language of
GARA provides, 'no civil action... may be brought.. .if the acci-
dent occurred - (1) after the applicable limitation period. '""8
The rationalization for its finding comes from the court's belief
that Congress intended to revive the economic health of the
general aviation aircraft manufacturing industry by lifting the
requirement that manufacturers tolerate the possibility of litiga-
tion for an indefinite time after they sell an airplane. 9
The court also differentiated a statute of repose from a statute
of limitations, claiming that the focus of each is entirely differ-
ent.20 A statute of repose, according to the court, proceeds on
the basis that nobody should be liable once a specified amount
of time has passed, and from that point forward, it would be
14 Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110 (citing Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at
867).
15 Id.; Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 546 (1949).
16 Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110.
17 Id.
18 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(a), 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 40101 note)).
19 Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110-11.
20 Id. at 1111.
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unjust to permit an action to proceed.21 The court established
its appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine by
noting that the right to be free from the burdens of trial is an
22essential aspect of the GARA statute of repose.--
After establishing its jurisdiction, the court addressed the
main issue of the case concerning the event that triggered the
running of the statute of repose. Kennedy argued that the 18-
year period did not begin to run until 1986, the year the heli-
copter was first type certified and received its first airworthiness
certificate.21 Since the Navy originally used the helicopter, Ken-
nedy argued it was not a general aviation aircraft until sold in
1984, but rather it was a "public aircraft" defined to include air-
craft "used only for the U.S. Government," 24 and therefore, the
aircraft did not require a type certificate or an airworthiness cer-
tificate when used by the Navy.25 The court rejected this argu-
ment and agreed with Bell Helicopter that the initial delivery of
the aircraft triggered the limitations period, even though it
could not be considered a general aviation aircraft at that
time.26 The court concluded that the GARA statute of repose
began to run once Bell Helicopter delivered the helicopter to
the U.S. Navy in 1970, and therefore the limitations period had
expired by the time of the crash in 1996, barring Kennedy's
claim.2
7
Circuit Judge Paez, in his dissenting opinion, took issue with
the court's expansion of the collateral order doctrine to include
a statute of repose defense. He believed strongly that the
court's holding was an "unwarranted exception" that would give
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1112. GARA, which provides "no civil action for damages for death or
injury to persons or damage to property arising out of an accident involving a
general aviation aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the air-
craft," defines a general aviation aircraft in part as "any aircraft for which a type
certificate or an airworthiness certificate has been issued by the Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration." Pub. L. No. 103-298, §§ 2(a) & (c), 108
Stat. 1552 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note).
24 49 U.S.C.A. § 40102(a)(37) (West 1996).
25 Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112.
26 Id. The court noted that under GARA § 2(a) (1) (A), the limitations period
begins upon delivery of the "aircraft" and does not refer to the delivery of a "gen-
eral aviation aircraft." Moreover, GARA § 3(1) defines "aircraft" as "any contri-
vance invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly, in the air." Id.; Pub. L. No.
103-298, §§2(a)(1)(A), 3(1), 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 note).
27 Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112.
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defendants in a protected industry the added advantage in liti-
gation of piecemeal review anytime Congress enacted a statute
of repose. 28 According to Judge Paez, the summary judgment
order denying Bell Helicopter's statute of repose defense did
not meet the condition that the appealed-from order be "effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment."2 9 Judge
Paez argued that because general aviation manufacturers may
obtain full review on appeal after final judgment, the court
should not use the collateral order doctrine to hear an appeal
from an order denying a GARA statute of repose defense.?
Furthermore, Judge Paez felt the majority opinion misplaced
its comparison of GARA's defense to a government official's
claim of qualified immunity,3' noting that "qualified immunity,
however, is fundamentally distinct from the GARA statute of re-
pose."32 The protections of qualified immunity are rooted in
preventing the social costs created "from the broad-ranging dis-
covery that can be peculiarly disruptive of effective govern-
ment."13 3 GARA, according to Judge Paez, conspicuously did not
contain these social costs and its purpose is not to relieve the
general aviation manufacturers from social costs, but from the
economic costs of claims of products liability, which any defen-
dant faces in a tort action. 34 Finally, Judge Paez argued that
GARA resembles the text of many statutes of limitations, 35 so
Congress intended only to provide a defense to liability, and not
immunity from suit and a right to appeal under the collateral
order doctrine.36
The majority's holding correctly applied the plain meaning of
the GARA statute of repose, but its inclusion of the GARA de-
fense into the collateral order doctrine is misplaced. The U.S.
Supreme Court has stressed that the "narrow" exception to the
final judgment rule should remain that way and should never
28 Id. at 1113 (Paez, J., dissenting).
2n Id.
30 Id.
31 "Orders denying a claim of immunitv are generally immediately appealable
where the immunity guarantees a right not to stand trial." Meek v. County of
Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 1999).
32 Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1114.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Judge Paez pointed to the statute of limitations tinder 28 U.S.C. § 1658,
which states, "a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the
date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years
after the cause of action accrues." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658 (West 1994)).
"( Id. at 1115 (Paez, J., dissenting).
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swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal
that should be postponed until final judgment has been en-
tered. The conditions required for a collateral order appeal
are stringent, subject to broad scrutiny, and courts must con-
sider not only whether a particular injustice will be avoided by a
prompt appeal, but also the entire category to which a claim
belongs. Moreover, merely identifying some interest that
would be forever lost has never alone satisfied the third require-
ment necessary to fall under the collateral order doctrine.3 9
The inclination to prevent expanding the scope of the doctrine
cannot be superseded merely by labeling an interest as "a right
not to stand trial."40 "Virtually every right that could be en-
forced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely be de-
scribed as conferring a right not to stand trial."41 The decisive
issue is whether "the essence" of the asserted right is a right not
to stand trial.42 Unlike qualified immunity or double jeopardy, a
statute of repose is not essentially a right to not stand trial.
When a district court has denied a defendant's claim of right
not to stand trial on double jeopardy grounds or claims of im-
munity, these decisions are immediately appealable because
these rights cannot be vindicated effectively after final judgment
is rendered.4 3 The Double Jeopardy Clause is specifically a guar-
antee against being put to trial twice for the same offense.44
Claims of immunity are an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability and would be lost if a case erroneously
went to trial.45 The court in Kennedy wrongly analogizes GARA
to these defenses of immunity and double jeopardy because
GARA, as a defense to liability, can be effectively reviewed on
appeal from a final judgment.
Judge Paez's dissent in Kennedy provides a sound argument by
comparing the GARA statute of repose to the common language
37 Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868.
38 Id. at 871.
39 Id. at 872.
40 Id. at 873.
41 Id.
42 Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524 (1988).
43 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985).
44 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, "nor shall
any person be subject (for the same offense) to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "This prohibition is not against being twice pun-
ished, but against being twice put in jeopardy." Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651, 661 (1977).
45 Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995).
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of a statute of limitations.4" If Congress had intended to provide
immunity from suit, the language used in GARA could have ex-
pressed that intent.47 The Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals have acknowledged the similarity between the Double
Jeopardy Clause and statutes of limitations, but have held that
statutes of limitations do not satisfy the third requirement of the
collateral order doctrine.4 8 Several other courts have held that
statutes of limitations do not allow immediate appeals under the
collateral order doctrine.4" "Although statutes of limitations em-
body historically important rights of repose and fairness for de-
fendants which are fundamental to our system.. .the rights they
protect are not irreparably lost absent immediate review."50
While the operation of the GARA statute of repose functions
differently than a statute of limitations, by employing the lan-
guage Congress chose, GARA should be compared with a statute
of limitations for purposes of the collateral order doctrine.
Congress enacted GARA to protect general aviation aircraft
manufacturers from the long tail of liability tort action to which
they were exposed under a tort action.5' The statute should be
interpreted as a defense to liability rather than an immunity
from suit. Otherwise, anytime Congress enacts a statute of re-
pose, a defendant can argue for a "piecemeal review" of the suit
based on the holding in Kennedy. This decision could prompt
more discussion of a well-settled area of the law preventing im-
mediate appeals to a statute of limitations defense when the lan-
guage of the statute is similar to the GARA statute of repose.
The intent of the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to the collat-
eral order doctrine is to keep exceptions to the final judgment
rule limited. The inclusion of a defense that can be effectively
reviewed on appeal after final judgment directly contradicts this
intent.
46 Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1115 (Paez, J., dissenting).
47 Compare Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(a), 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 40101 note), with 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658.
48 United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 126 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Davis, 873 F.2d 900, 908-09 (6th Cir. 1989).
49 United States v. Garib-Bazain, 222 F.3d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 2000) (dismissing
immediate appeal for lack of jurisdiction because statute of limitations defense
does not fall under collateral order doctuine); United States v. Weiss, 7 F.3d 1088,
1091 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282
does not allow an immediate appeal).
50 Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 232-33 (3d Cir. 1993).
51 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-525, pt. I. at 1-4 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1638, 1638-41.
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